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examiner to specialize in medical determinations; evidence would assume
an authoritative and useful character. Only by revising its antiquated
coroner system and by channeling the medical and legal responsibilities
to men technically trained to perform those functions can Indiana adequately meet the public needs.

THE NEED FOR A LIBERAL BUSINESS ENTRY STATUTE
IN INDIANA
The adversary system of law is premised on the general theory that
facts should be proved by a witness produced in court and subject to crossexamination. Because of a corresponding interest in obtaining all the
facts necessary for proper adjudication of the dispute by the court or
jury, deviations from this principle are being made when the trustworthiness of an offered item is substantially above reproach. The restrictiveness of common law rules of evidence has, in many jusidictions,' engendered the passage of legislation permitting records, relied upon daily by
businessmen in the conduct of their affairs,2 to be admitted and evaluated
by courts and juries. Indiana has not yet enacted such a statute,3 and
reliable records of this type are subject to exclusion as evidence by the
rules of hearsay4 and res gestae5 as applied by its courts. The present
1. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. ANN. (EvID.) §§ 1953e-53h (1946); Dr.. CODE ANN. §
4310 (1953); FLA. STAT. § 92.36 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-711 (1954); MiNN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 600.01-.04 (West 1947); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 93-801-1 to -01-4 (1947);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-12, 108-11 (Supp. 1953); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:82-34 to -37
(1952); N.D. REV. CODE § 31-0801 (1943); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.40 (1954);
ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 41.680-.710 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 91a-91d (Supp.
1954); TEX. STAT., art. 3737e (Supp. 1952) ; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 5.44.100-.120 (1951) ;
WYO. CoMsP. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-3122-25 (1945). See MORGAN et al., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM 52-53 (1927).
2. MORGAN et al., op. cit. supra note 1, at 51; Comment, 2 HASTINGS L-.- 40, 43
(1951). See notes 53-55 infra and accompanying text.
3. Two attempts to enact the UNIFORM BUSINESS RECORDS AS EVIDENCE ACT in
Indiana have failed, the bills having died in Senate committees. IND. S. JOUR. 552, 572,
783 (1937) ; IND. S. JOUR. 551, 570 (1943). See note 46 infra for the pertinent provisions of this act. Indiana has adopted legislation permitting reproduced business records
to be admitted in evidence as original records. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-1649-51 (Burns
Supp. 1955).
4. Bank of Poneto v. Kimmel, 91 Ind. App. 325, 168 N.E. 604 (1929) ; Over v.
Dehne, 38 Ind. App. 427, 75 N.E. 664 (1906) ; Dodge v. Morrow, 14 Ind. App. 534, 43
N.E. 153 (1895) ; The First Nat'I Bank of Porter County v. Williams, 4 Ind. App. 501,
31 N.E.370 (1891).
5. Hitt v. Carr, 201 Ind. 17, 162 N.E. 409 (1928) ; Pittsburg, Cincinnati & St.
Louis R.R. Co. v. Noel, 77 Ind. 110 (1881) ; Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Campbell, 85 Ind. App. 450, 150 N.E. 31, 151 N.E. 682 (1926) ; Marks v. Box, 54 Ind. App.
487, 103 N.E. 27 (1913).

NOTES
limitations upon admissibility, more liberal than at common law,6 and
the modern statutory reform present the question of the feasibility of
adopting business entry legislation in this state.
Significantly, the common law of most states admits business records
in evidence more often as an exception to the hearsay rule than as part
of the res gestae.7 The latter doctrine, however, based primarily on Professor Greenleaf's treatise,8 is found in many Indiana decisions9 and
those of other states."° Justification for the res gestae rule of exclusion
is that only business records which are contemporaneous verbal acts belonging to, and explaining, the main fact in issue are trustworthy enough
to be weighed as evidence."1
To be admissible as res gestae business records must meet certain
specific requirements: The entrant must make the entries within a rea6. See note 29 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the liberal features
of the Indiana law.
7. See 32 C.J.S., Evidence § 683 (1942). The admissibility of business records in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule is discussed at length in 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE §§ 1517-61 (3d ed. 1940).
8. 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE §§ 115-20 (6th ed. 1899). Greenleaf considers res gestae
as original evidence and distinguishes between it and hearsay. He argues that writings
by a third person, not under oath, are not hearsay where the statements are the inseparable concomitant of the principal fact in controversy. "In such cases it is obvious
that the writings . . . are not within the meaning of hearsay, but are original . . .
facts, admissible in proof of the issue." Id. at § 100. Professor Thayer has criticized
this view that declarations that are part of the res gestae are admitted in evidence as not
being within the scope of the hearsay rule. He states that Greenleaf has given "a vague
reach and diffusion" to the res gestae doctrine and "his views, in some respects very illconsidered, have slipped unquestioned into the opinions of some American courts."
THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS 262-63 (1908). Thayer contends that the res gestate rule, in
any sense that it belongs to the law of evidence, should be considered as an exception to
the hearsay rule. Id. at 266. A more recent authority states that the term, res gestae, is
a substitute for reasoning and produces confusion of thought. He suggests a proper
classification of statements admissible now as res gestae and advocates the termination
of the use of this phraseology by the courts. Morgan, A Suggested Classification of
Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229, 232-39 (1922).
9. See Hitt v. Carr, 201 Ind. 17, 162 N.E. 409 (1928) ; Place v. Baugher, 159 Ind.
232, 64 N.E. 852 (1902) ; Fleming v. Yost, 137 Ind. 95, 36 N.E. 705 (1893) ; Davis Construction Co. v. Granite Sand and Gravel Co., 90 Ind. App. 379, 163 N.E. 240 (1929) ;
Catherwood v. Ford, 86 Ind. App. 228, 156 N.E. 567 (1927) ; J. P. Smith Shoe Co. v.
Curme-Feltmen Shoe Co., 71 Ind. App. 401, 118 N.E. 360 (1919); Marks v. Box, 54
Ind. App. 487, 103 N.E. 27 (1913) ; Indianapolis Outfitting Co. v. Cheyne Electric Co.,
52 Ind. App. 153, 100 N.E. 468 (1913).
10. See Roche v. Roche, 286 Ill. 336, 121 N.E. 621 (1918) ; Hansen v. Kaperonis,
243 Iowa 1257, 55 N.W.2d 284 (1952) ; Carozza v. Williams, 190 Md. 143, 57 A.2d 782
(1948); Anchor Milling Co. v. Walsh, 108 Mo. 277, 18 S.W. 904 (1891); Linden v.
Thieriot, 96 App. Div. 256, 89 N.Y. Supp. 273 (1904); Osterling v. Allegheny Trust
Co., 260 Pa. 64, 103 Atl. 528 (1918).
11. 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE §§ 100, 115, 120 (16th ed. 1899) ; Fleming v. Yost, 137
Ind. 95, 97, 36 N.E. 705, 706 (1893) ; Marks v. Box, 54 Ind. App. 487, 501, 103 N.E. 27,
33 (1913) ; Hunter v. State, 40 N.J.L. 495, 537 (1878).
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sonable time after the transaction, 12 in the regular course of his business
duty,"3 have personal knowledge of the facts," and have no motive to
enter the transaction falsely. 5 The Indiana decisions express the additional necessity that the records be original.1 6 The non-availability of the
recorders as witnesses is not a prerequisite for admissibility; however, if
available, the proponent must produce them as well as the records.'
The exception made to the hearsay rule for business entries 8 has
had two distinct developments in this country, one admitting records
made by a party, 9 and the other, the regular entries exception, admitting
those made by third persons.20 Statutes removing the incompetency of
parties in civil suits eliminated any need for this distinction, 2' and it is
no longer of any significance in this state.22 The usual justification for
the regular entries exception to the hearsay rule is that the trustworthiness of entries made in the regular course of business and the necessity
to resort to records as proof when the participants are not available as
12. 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 115 (16th ed. 1899) ; House v. Beak, 141 Ill. 290, 296,
30 N.E. 1065, 1067 (1892); Hitt v. Carr, 201 Ind. 17, 29, 162 N.E. 409, 413 (1928);
State ex rel. Romona Oolitic Stone Co. v. Central States Bridge Co., 49 Ind. App. 544,
549, 97 N.E. 803, 805 (1912).
13. See note 12 supra.
14. 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 115 (16th ed. 1899) ; Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Campbell, 85 Ind. App. 450, 464, 150 N.E. 31, 36, 151 N.E. 682 (1926) ; Marks
v. Box, 54 Ind. App. 487, 502, 103 N.E. 27, 33 (1913).

See Osterling v. Allegheny

Trust Co., 260 Pa. 64, 103 AtI. 528 (1918).
15. 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 115 (16th ed. 1899). The Indiana decisions do not
stress this requirement.
16. Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Campbell, 85 Ind. App. 450, 464, 150 N.E.
31, 36, 151 N.E. 682 (1926) ; State ex rel. Romona Oolitic Stone Co. v. Central States
Bridge Co., 49 Ind. App. 544, 549, 97 N.E. 803, 805 (1912).
17. 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE §§ 115, 120 (16th ed. 1899) ; Fleming v. Yost, 137 Ind.
95, 98, 36 N.E. 705, 706 (1893) ; Marks v. Box, 54 Ind. App. 487, 501, 103 N.E. 27, 32
(1913). See Hansen v. Kaperonis, 243 Iowa 1257, 55 N.W.2d 284 (1952).
18. See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1521-32 (3d ed. 1940); MORGAN et al., op. cit.
supra note 1, at 51-53.
19. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1517 (3d ed. 1940). This was known as the shopbook
rule and its basic requirements were: the party kept no clerk; the entry was not a cash
transaction; the party had a good reputation for honest and correct dealing; the records
had an honest appearance; and that some of the articles charged were delivered or some
of the services charged were performed. Ray, Business Records-A Proposed Rule of
Admissibility, 5 Sw. L.J. 33, 34 (1951). See 5 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1536-58 (3d ed.

1940) ; 2

MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE

265-66 (1954).

For an extensive dis-

cussion of the shopbook rule and its development in this country, see Radtke v. Taylor,
105 Ore. 559, 210 Pac. 863 (1922).
20. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1517 (3d ed. 1940) ; Norville, The Uniform Business
Records As Evidence Act, 27 ORE. L. REV. 188, 189 (1948).
21. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1559-60 (3d ed. 1940) ; MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 282
(1954) ; Ray, supra note 20, at 34.
22. State ex rel. Romona Oolitic Stone Co. v. Central States Bridge Co., 49 Ind.
App. 544, 549, 97 N.E. 803, 805 (1912) ; Johnson v. Zimmerman, 42 Ind. App. 165, 17172, 84 N.E. 541, 544 (1908) (concurring opinion).

NOTES
witnesses23 vitiate whatever danger inheres in' a lack of opportunity to
cross-examine."
The common law requirements of the regular entries exception 25 are
analogous to those needed to frustrate exclusion under the res gestae rule;
in addition, the regular entries exception requires preliminary proof that
the participants are not available as witnesses. 21 In Culver v. Marks,27

however, the court indicated that the application of the regular entries
exception in Indiana is more liberal than at common law. This case admitted business entries even though the participants were available and
appeared as witnesses, on the ground that necessity to admit them was
shown by their non-recollection of the facts recorded.28 Unfortunatley,
only a few reported decisions in this state follow this liberal trend and
admit business records under the regular entries exception.29 Instead,
numerous decisions exclude or admit business entries on the basis of the
res gestae doctrine."0
23. 5 WIG ot, EVIDENCE §§ 1521-22 (3d ed. 1940); McColMlCx, EVIDENCE § 281
(1954); Ginsburg, The Admissibility of Bicsness Records in Evidence, 29 NEB. L. REV.
60, 61, 68 (1949).
24. See 2 MORGAN, op. cit. supra note 19, at 216, 220; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1362
(3d ed. 1940).
25. Under this exception to the hearsay rule the proponent of the records must
show that the participants are unavailable; that the entries are original; made in the
regular course of business, within a reasonable time of the transaction recorded; and
that they were made by participants having personal knowledge of the facts. Norville,
supra note 21, at 192-93. See 5 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1523-32 (3d ed. 1940) (discussion of each limitation).
26. See note 25 supra. The significant distinction between the regular entries exception and the res gestae rule is that under the exception the proponent must show
necessity in the form of non-availability of the participants as witnesses. The res gestae
rule is more liberal for necessity does not have to be proved, the entries being direct
evidence of the litigated transaction. Fleming v. Yost, 137 Ind. 95, 98, 36 N.E. 705, 706
(1893). Under the regular entries exception the records are admitted as evidence to
prove their own truth, but under the res gestae rule they are admitted to prove the transaction in issue of which they are a natural part. Ibid.
27. 122 Ind. 554, 23 N.E. 1086 (1889).
28. Id. at 563, 23 N.E. at 1089.
29. State ex rel. Romona Oolitic Stone Co. v. Central States Bridge Co., 49 Ind.
App. 544, 97 N.E. 803 (1912) (records admitted apparently on the basis of both the
regular entries and res gestae rules) ; Cleland v. Applegate, 8 Ind. App. 499, 35 N.E.
1108 (1893). See Johnson v. Culver, 116 Ind. 278, 19 N.E. 129 (1888). Liberal decisions have held that the absence of an entry that would have been made in the regular
course of business if the transaction in question had occurred is admissible evidence that
the transaction did not occur. Schneider v. State, 220 Ind. 28, 35, 40 N.E.2d 322, 324
(1942); Marks v. Orth, 121 Ind. 10, 12, 22 N.E. 668, 669 (1889). A liberal trend was
also indicated by a case holding that ledger sheets were admissible in evidence as original
records. Polus v. Conner, 92 Ind. App. 465, 467, 176 N.E. 234, 235 (1931).
The res gestae rule is liberal to the extent that it does not require the showing of
non-availability. See notes 17 and 26 supra and accompanying text.
30. See note 9 supra.

316

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

The particular limitations of the res gestae rule are manifest in decisions refusing business entries as evidence under this exclusion. 3 In
3
Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Campbell,"
for example, business
records of the insurance company made at the home office in New York
from reports made by its Louisville agency, showing non-payment of
premiums, were excluded as not part of the res gestae. The court said,
"[T]he entries offered in evidence were not original entries made by
one having knowledge of the facts, or to whom the facts had been reported by one transacting the business..
,"" This holding clearly
shows that the res gestae rule is beset with restrictions which the business entry statutes were designed to obviate."4
Modern legislation is based on model statutes, which are the result
of an awareness of a need for reform in evidence law.
The Commonwealth Act,36 originally adopted in New York,3" has served as a model
for the act enacted by Congress 8 and a number of state statutes.3 9 Under
this act, the proponent must prove, to the satisfaction of the court,"0 that
the record was made in the regular course of business4 and that it was
the regular course of business to make the entries at the time of the
31. See e.g., Hitt v. Carr, 201 Ind. 17, 29-30, 162 N.E. 409, 413 (1928) ; Marks v.
Box, 54 Ind. App. 487, 500-02, 103 N.E. 27, 33 (1913).
32. 85 Inid. App. 450, 150 N.E. 31, 151 N.E. 682 (1926).

33. Id. at 464, 150 N.E. at 36.
34. See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1520 (3d ed. 1940) ; Norville, supra note 21, at
194-95; Comment, 2 HASTINGS L.J. 40, 42-43 (1951).
35. See 2 MORGAN, op. cit. supra note 19, at 271; MCCORNICK, EVIDEXCE § 289
(1954) ; Ray, supra note 20, at 38-39.
36. In 1925, a Committee of fifteen was appointed by the Commonwealth Fund of
New York to examine and report on the admissibility of business records and other
rules of evidence needing liberalization. This committee included Morgan and Wigmore among other eminent scholars, and their report was published in 1927. 9 U.L.A.
386 (1951) ; Ray, supra note 20, at 39. The Commonwealth Act is as follows:
"Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise,
made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence or event
shall be admissible in evidence in proof of said act, transaction, occurrence, or
event, if the trial judge shall find that it was made in the regular course of any
business, and that it was the regular course of such business to make such
memorandum or record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence or event
or within a reasonable time thereafter. All other circumstances of the making
of such writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant
or maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but they shall not affect its admissibility. The term business shall include business, profession, occupation and
calling of every kind."
MORGAN et al., op. cit. supra note 1, at 63.
37. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. AcT § 374-a.
38. 49 STAT. 1561 (1936), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1952).
39. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7903 (1949); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 35, § 68
(1951); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 233, § 78 (Supp. 1954); MICH. Comp. LAWS § 617.53
(1948); R.I. GEN. LAws c. 538, § 1 (1938).
40. See note 36 supra for the provisions of the Commonwealth Act.
41. Ibid.

NOTES
transaction or within a reasonable time thereafter. 2 All other circumstances shown may affect the weight of the entries as evidence but not
their admissibility."
Many states44 have adopted a similar statute45 approved by the Comhissioners on Uniform State Laws.4 6 Except for change and reduction
in wording,47 the only important distinction between the model statutes
are that the Uniform Act contains the term "condition" among the facts
that may be recorded,4" requires that the records be testified to by a custodian or other qualified witness,"9 and gives the court more discretion to
determine the record's reliability prior to admitting it."0 Although the
Uniform Act, by placing more discretion in'the court, provides a desirable flexibility, predictability of admission based on precise standards
such as those found in the Commonwealth Act seems more satisfactory
to the parties of the action."'
Regardless of which of the model acts is deemed preferable, a statute
based upon either of them would be more liberal than the res gestae rule;
and business records now excluded, such as those in the Campbell case,
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. See note 1 supra. A convenient table of the states that have adopted modern
business entry legislation patterned after the Uniform Act is found in 9 U.L.A. 385
(1951, Supp. 178, 1954).
45. The Conference in the present act has attempted to devise a standard wording
that will uniformize the provisions of the Commonwealth Act. 9 U.L.A. 386 (1951).
46. The pertinent provisions of the UNIFORM BUSINESS RECORDS AS EVIDENCE Act
are as follows:
"§ 1. Definition.-The term "business" shall include every kind of business, profession, occupation, calling or operation of institutions, whether carried on for profit or not.
§ 2. Business Records.-A record of an act, condition or event, shall, in so far as
relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its
identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of
business, at or near the time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the
court, the sources of information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its adimssion."
9 U.L.A. 387 (1951). The American Law Institute, in its MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, has
also proposed a business records statute. The only significant addition that the Model
Code makes is a section providing that evidence of the absence of an entry in a record
may be shown to prove the non-occurrence of the transaction in issue. MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENCE rule 514 (1942).
47. See Ray, supra note 20, at 40-41 for a concise explanation of the distinctions
between the Commonwealth and Uniform Acts. An informative graphic comparison of
the two model statutes is found in Norville, supra note 21, at 198.
48. See notes 36 and 46 supra for the provisions of the Commonwealth and Uniform Acts.
49. See note 46 supra.
50. Ibid.
51. McCoRMICKc, EVIDENCE § 289 (1954). Proposed business entry legislation
should require specific findings by the trial judge as a condition precedent to the admissibility of the records instead of giving him broad discretion. Ray, supra note 20, at 45.
In practice statutes based on the Commonwealth and Uniform Acts are given substantially the same effect by the courts. 2 MORGAN, op. cit. mspra note 19, at 274.
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would in many instances be admitted because the proponent would not
have to prove that the records are original or that the participants had
personal knowledge.5 2 The legislation would conform more to the needs
of modern business practices than the present law. Businessmen, who
daily conduct their enterprises on the basis of extensive records, look
with disfavor upon courts excluding them as evidence on a patently technical ground.53 The rapid growth of employment and accounting systems" indicate that the requirements of the regular entries and res gestae
rules are no longer practical. Under modern business usage, there is lack
of motive, and little opportunity, to falsify entries made in a large accounting department because of the employee's impersonal relation to the
records.55 The trustworthiness afforded by these business practices argue
strongly for the adoption of a statute favoring the liberal admission of
business records.
The enactment would have the additional advantage of compelling
both parties to an action and the court to rely upon one distinct standard
of admissibility, the code, rather than upon the dual standards now available under the Indiana law. A statute would relieve the courts of the
burden of determining whether the record is offered to show the truth of
its own terms56 or as direct proof of the transaction in issue."
A contention that the present status of the law is adequately liberal
in view of restrictive applications of the codes in other jurisdictions" has
but superficial merit. The United States Supreme Court held in Palmer
v. Hoffman,5 9 that the federal statute did not admit as evidence accident
52. See notes 36 and 46 supra.
53. MORGAN et al., op. cit. supra note 1, at 51, 57-61; Ray, supra note 20, at 36. See
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 307, (D.C. Cir. 1944) (dissent).
54. MORGAN et al., op. cit. supra note 1, at 57-61. It is conceded that not all businesses utilize complex systems of accounting, but Morgan indicates that correspondence
with many manufacturers reveals that numerous operations are required to complete a
transaction, that it is frequently impossible to later identify the person who performed
any particular part of it, and that the maker of the final entry usually has no personal
knowledge of the transaction recorded. Id. at 61.
55. 5 WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1522 (3d ed. 1940) ; Comment, 2 HASTINGs L.J. 40, 4243 (1951). Instead, the motive is to keep the records accurate because of the rigors of
supervision and the complexities of accounting systems. Ibid.
56. See note 26 supra.
57. Ibid.
58. See, e.g., Masterson v. Pa. Ry. Co., 182 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1950); Cainos v.
United States, 163 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1947) ; Roge v. Valentine, 255 App. Div. 475, 7
N.Y.S.2d 958 (1938) ; Geroeami v. Fancy Foods & Products Co., 249 App. Div. 221, 291
N.Y. Supp. 837 (1937) ; 5 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1530a, n. 1 (3d ed. 1940). "The interpretation of the new statutes has not always found the Courts ready to give full effect
to the spirit of the statutes." Id. at § 1530a.
59. 318 U.S. 109, 318 U.S. 800 (1943). In Indiana accident reports required by
statute are not admissible as evidence in any civil or criminal trial arising out of the
accident. IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1920 (Burns 1952).

NOTES
reports made by a railroad engineer in the course of his employment, on
the ground that such reports were not primarily intended for the internal
business of the railroad but for litigation. The result in this case has been
sharply criticized on the basis that the language of the federal statute
clearly admits any report if it is the regular course of business to make it.6"
The New York court similarly limited its statute in Johnson v. Lutz6' by
excluding records made in the regular course of business from information
obtained from an outside course. It is arguable that both decisions illustrate only that courts, in deciding preliminary questions of fact under the
6 2
codes, have the power to exclude records which they deem untrustworthy.
These strict judicial interpretations probably, however, reflect the
tendency of some judges to cling to the tenets of common law rules which
were controlling prior to the adoption of the codes. - Since the present law
in this state is more liberal than the common law of some of the states
which have enacted statutes,6" there is tbasis for believing that the judiciary in Indiana would apply the act with a truly charitable interpretation.
Consequently, the liberal aspects of the present Indiana law are, in this
sense, an argument for, rather than against, the enactment of a liberal
business entry statute.
Another possible contention opposed to adoption is that business
records otherwise excluded as privilege or as opinion would be admitted
under a code.6 Although the statutory rule of privilege may be implicitly
repealed by the codes,66 it still influences the decisions reached by the
60.

MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE:

COMMON SENSE AND CoAmIoN LAW

156 (1947); M%,or-

gan, The Law of Evidence, 194z-1945, 59 HARv. L. REV. 481, 566 (1946). But see Note,

43 COLm. L. REV. 392 (1943).
61. 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930).
62. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1944)
(dissent).
[I]t is hard to set
63. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1530a, n. 1 (3d ed. 1940). "...
the professional mind working on new formulas." Id. at § 1530a.
64. See note 29 supra.
65. See McCoRdlcK, EVIDENcE § 290 (1954); Note, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 920, 93132 (1948).
66. Norville, supra note 21, at 210-11.

The significant provisions of the Indiana

statute are as follows:
"The following persons shall not be competent witnesses:

Third. Attorneys, as to confidential communications made to them in the
course of their professional business, and as to advice given in such cases.
Fourth.

Physicians, as to matter communicated to them, as such, by pa-

tients in the course of their professional business, or advice given in such cases.
Fifth. Clergymen, as to confessions or admissions made to them in course
of discipline enjoined by their respective churches.
Sixth. Husband and wife, as to communications made to each other."

IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1714 (Burns 1946).

Most of the decisions discussed in the text

consider the patient-physician privilege in regard to the admissibility of hospital records.
Presumably, the same results would attach to the other types of"privileged 'communica-
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courts." Thus, hospital records have been excluded as privileged communications between doctor and patient.68 It is noteworthy, however, that a
recognized authority discounts the desirability of this privilege and advocates its discontinuance as a rule of evidence.69
In considering the opinion rule, the federal court, in New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Taylor,7 ° held that hospital records containing a psychiatric
diagnosis were not admissible under the federal statute because they involved opinion and'stated that the application of the act should be limited
to records made of routine observations. This holding, reflecting the view
reached in some states,"' has been the subject of much criticism by commentators,"1 who contend that the opinion rule is antiquated and should
tions found in the Indiana statute. There are many limitations on the patient-physician
privilege, and it can be easily waived. See Stayner v. Nye, 227 Ind. 231, 85 N.E. 2d 496
(1948); Stalker v. Breeze, 186 Ind. 221, 114 N.E. 968 (1917). The patient-physician
exclusion is abrogated in workmen's compensation proceedings in Indiana. "No fact
communicated to . . . any physician . . . who may have attended or examined the
employee . . . shall be privileged, either in the hearings provided for in this act ....
or in any action at law brought to recover damages against any employer . . . subject
to the compensation provisions of this act." IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-1227 (Burns 1952).
67. See, e.g., Buckminster's Estate v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 147 F.2d 331 (2d Cir.
1944) (where an implied waiver of the privilege was found); Kinbacher v. Schneider,
194 Misc. 969, 89 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1949) (hospital records held privileged); Palmer v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 150 Misc. 669, 270 N.Y. Supp. 10 (1934) (record of
diagnosis was privileged) ; Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.2d 245 (1947)
(privilege strictly construed).
68. Sher v. DeHaven, 199 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Vilardi v. Vilardi, 200 Misc.
1043, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 342 (1951) ; Hurd v. Republic Steel Corp., 275 App. Div. 725, 87
N.Y.S.2d 64 (1949). ". . . [Clourts have generally held that hospital records are within the privilege to the extent that they incorporate the statements made by the patient to
the doctor and the physician's diagnostic findings." McCoRMICK, EVIDENcE § 290 (1954).
An opinion of the Indiana Attorney General indicates that hospital records are not admissible under the confidential communication rule, although no Indiana decision has
specifically reached this result. Os. IND. ATT'y GEN. 202-08 (1945). For a decision indicating that such records should be excluded as privileged communications, see Mathews
v. Rex Health and Accident Ins. Co., 86 Ind. App. 335, 157 N.E. 467 (1927).
69. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380a (3d ed. 1940). "There is little to be said in favor of the privilege, and a great deal to be said against it. The adoption of it . . . is
earnestly to be deprecated." Ibid. "The injury to justice by the repression of the facts
• . . is a hundredfold greater than any injury which might be done by disclosure." Ibid.
Restrictive exclusionary rulings and precgdents due to the Indiana competency and
privilege statutes indicate the need for legislative reform. Note, 27 IND. L.J. 256, 277
(1952).
"Implication of waiver from surrounding circumstances constitutes a potentially effective means of limiting claims of privilege which unduly obstruct introduction
of testimony." Id. at 278.
70. 147 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
71. Skoller v. Short, 35 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1942) ; In re O'Grady's Estate, 254 App. Div.
691, 3 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1938) ; Lane v. Samuels, 350 Pa. 446, 39 A.2d 626 (1944) ; Cline v.
Evans, 127 W. Va. 113, 31 S.E.2d 681 (1944). See Paxos v. Jarka Corp., 314 Pa. 148,
171 Atl. 468 (1934) (decided prior to passage of business entry legislation).
72. Morgan, supra note 60, at 562. Morgan suggests that the test laid down by the
case is unworkable and places an impossible burden on the court which would have to
determine whether the particular diagnosis is one on which competent physicians might
differ. Id. at 564. See Notes, 33 GEo. L.J. 349 (1945); 18 So. CALIF. L. REv. 60

NOTES
not exclude records admissible under the codes. Recent federal cases sharing this view, disagree with the result reached in Taylor and admit hospital
records which otherwise would be subject to exclusion under the opinion
rule.7" These divergent attitudes expressed by the authorities lead irresistably to the conclusion that a business entry statute would not automatically admit records otherwise excluded under the rules of opinion and
privilege. Instead, a statute would offer the courts the opportunity to
reappraise the value of these rules in light of contemporary criticism.
It is recommended that Indiana enact a business entry statute patterned after one of the model codes. The assurance of trustworthiness
furnished by the internal consistency of business records in modern commercial practice is a compelling argument for the adoption of such an act.
Moreover, it would coalesce the duality of hearsay and res gestae as rules
of exclusion into one clear standard of admissibility and would have the
additional salutary result of eliminating the abstruse resgestae terminology
from the judicial vocabulary. Arguments against passage, emphasizing
that the present law is adequate or that the rules of- opinion and privilege
would be circumvented by a statute are deceptive. These objections overlook that adoption of liberal legislation would in many cases admit entries
which are now excluded under the res gestae rule, and they neglect to consider that a code would permit the courts to re-evaluate opinion and privilege as rules of evidence. Once a policy favoring liberal admissibility of
evidence is accepted, no cogent argument against adoption of business
entry legislation can be advanced.
(1945) ; 54 YALE L.J. 868 (1945). To apply the much misused opinion rule to exclude
business entries cannot be justified. 5 WIGMORE, ]EVIDENCE § 1533 (3d ed. 1940).
73. Medina v. Erickson, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 1062 (9th Cir. Oct. 19, 1955) ; Landon v.
United States, 197 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1952) (holding that the fact the entry reflected
opinion went to weight and not admissibility); Korte v. New York N.H. & H. R.R. Co.,
191 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 868 (1951). But see Baltimore & 0.
R.R. v. O'Neill, 211 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1954) (excluding report not an automatic reflection of observations).

